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AN IMPERIUM OF RIGHTS:  
CONSEQUENCES OF OUR CULTURAL REVOLUTION 
 
Steven Alan Samson* 
 
ABSTRACT 
The ‘empowerment of rights’, whether domestically or globally, presents 
itself in at least a double aspect: both as a cultural revolution and as a 
political strategy.  The strategy pursued by cultural revolutionaries who 
equate liberalism with secularism is to turn the basic values of the West 
into weapons against it so that its inherent defense mechanisms will be 
rendered ineffective.  This strategy is most apt to succeed by provoking 
crises of conscience through redefinitions of human rights that, in the end, 
lead from to individual and institutional conversion.  But, as Marcello 
Pera notes, political liberalism itself suffers from an ‘ethical deficit’.  
Torn from its religious roots, it lacks the requisite thickness of moral 
authority needed to protect the rights of persons and resist threats to the 
very existence of civil society.  Thus have we come to confuse despotism 
with liberty and undercut our capacity for self-government. 
I INTRODUCTION 
In Democracy without Nations? Pierre Manent describes the challenge 
facing the West: 
Philippe Raynaud has recently underscored the following important point: the 
original understanding on which the modern state was founded strongly linked 
individual rights and public authority or power.  Today, however, rights have 
invaded every field of reflection and even every aspect of consciousness.  They 
have broken their alliance with power and have even become its implacable 
enemy.  From an alliance between rights and power we have moved to the 
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demand for an empowerment of rights.  The well-known sovereign ‘power of 
judges’ claiming to act in the name of human rights is the most visible 
manifestation of this trend.
1
 
Manent sees this elevation of rights over power as ‘an increasingly 
decisive and debilitating factor at work in the political life of the 
European nations.’2  This is the latest philosophical wrinkle in the use of 
individualism and identity politics to dissolve the cultural and 
civilizational structures that support ‘civil liberty and self-government.’3  
Accordingly, international law and the concept of global governance have 
been among the major transmission belts driving this imperium of 
‘human rights’ during the past generation. 
What then becomes of individuals and their traditional liberties?  This is 
the age-old problem of ‘the one and the many’: unity vs. diversity.  We 
live particular lives at particular times and in particular places.  We 
cannot go beyond this, as Chantal Delsol warns: ‘The identification of the 
singular human being with a universal culture therefore would be 
equivalent to lessening him, perhaps even to destroying him.’4  She notes 
                                           
1
  Pierre Manent, Democracy without Nations? The Fate of Self-Government in 
Europe (ISI Books, 2007) 16. 
2
  Ibid 16.  And not just in: ‘Those keeping score on the new diplomacy game 
should watch for expansions of international law in three areas: (1) treaty-based 
law; (2) universal jurisdiction, as part of customary international law; and (3) 
international organizations and global governance.  New diplomacy players are 
working for breakthroughs in all these aspects of international law.  Taken 
together, these reforms could well revolutionize international law at the expense 
of national sovereignty.’  David Davenport, ‘The New Diplomacy Threatens 
American Sovereignty and Values’, in A Country I Do Not Recognize: The 
Legal Assault on American Values (Hoover Institution Press, 2006) 124. 
3
  Francis Lieber, On Civil Liberty and Self-Government (J.B. Lippincott, 3
rd
 ed, 1877).  Lieber 
held the first chair of political science in America, launched the first encyclopedia, developed a 
code of military conduct that shaped the later Hague and Geneva conventions, and corresponded 
with Alexis de Tocqueville. 
4
  Chantal Delsol, Unjust Justice: Against the Tyranny of International Law (ISI 
Books, 2008) 84.  At the beginning of his study of the Leftist ideologies and 
movements, Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn noted: ‘we share with the beast the 
instinct to seek identity with another; we become fully human only through our 
drive and enthusiasm for diversity.’  Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Leftism 
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that earlier bids for universal unity through ancient empires and 
Christendom left diversity in place.  The real danger, instead, arose with 
the French Revolution with its ‘notion of a world government deployed 
throughout the entire earth with all the prerogatives of what Christians 
called “temporal government.”’5 
II CULTURAL REVOLUTIONS 
The ‘empowerment of rights’, whether domestically or globally, presents 
itself in at least a double aspect: both as a cultural revolution and as a 
political strategy.
6
  The fundamental principle of the long-term strategies 
advocated by Antonio Gramsci, along with the Fabian Society, the 
Progressive movement, and the Frankfurt School, consists in turning the 
basic values of the West, along with its institutional supports, into 
weapons against it so that its inherent defense mechanisms will not work 
effectively.
7
 
This process, of course, is not confined to Europe.  In the American 
context, appeals are made increasingly to humanity at large, especially by 
the American political class.
8
  As early as 2002 the United States 
                                                                                                                         
Revisited: From de Sade and Marx to Hitler and Pol Pot (Regnery Gateway, 
1990) 4. 
5
  Ibid 2. 
6
  Helmut Schelsky, ‘The New Strategy of Revolution: The “Long March” 
through the Institutions’, (Fall, 1974) 345-355.  
<http://www.mmisi.org/ma/18_04/schelsky.pdf>. 
7
  This strategy systematizes a Nietzschean ‘transvaluation of all values.’  Ralph 
de Toledano, Cry Havoc! The Great American Bring-down and How It 
Happened (Anthem Books, 2006); Paul Kengor, Takedown: From Communists 
to Progressives, How the Left Has Sabotaged Family and Marriage (WND 
Books, 2015); and John Fonte, Why There Is a Culture War: Gramsci and 
Tocqueville in America, Orthodoxy Today 
<http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles/FonteCultureWar.php?/articles/Fonte
CultureWar.shtml>. 
8
  It is a habit that was clearly on display in the Declaration of Independence: ‘a 
decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the 
causes which impel them to the separation.’ 
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Supreme Court began to cite international laws and decisions as 
constitutional precedents in specific cases.
9
  James Kurth sought to 
analyze the impact of an increasingly secular humanitarianism on 
American foreign policy by identifying a series of six stages of 
declension exhibited by what he called the ‘Protestant Deformation’, 
culminating in ‘universal human rights.’10   David Sehat made a similar 
observation about the use of the social sciences to develop a Progressive 
replacement for the Protestant ‘moral philosophy’ that was once a 
standard undergraduate capstone course in nineteenth century American 
colleges.
11
 
J. Budziszewski captures much of the subtlety of the process of changing 
from a Christian to a more secular ethic in his book, The Revenge of 
Conscience:  
As any sin passes through its stages from temptation, to toleration, to approval, 
its name is first euphemized, then avoided, then forgotten.  A colleague tells me 
that some scholars call child molestation ‘inter-generational intimacy’: that’s 
euphemism.  A good-hearted editor tried to talk me out of using the term 
                                           
9
  Julian Ku and John Yoo cite four examples of this practice, while adding: 
‘Foreign courts, of course, are usually interpreting their own constitutions or 
international law, not the U.S. Constitution.’  Julian Ku and John Yoo, Taming 
Globalization: International Law, the U.S. Constitution, and the New World 
Order (Oxford, 2012) 228. 
10
  James Kurth, ‘The Protestant Deformation and American Foreign Policy’ 
(Paper presented at The Philadelphia Society 37th National Meeting, 22 April 
2001). <http://phillysoc.org/kurth-the-protestant-deformation-and-american-
foreign-policy/>. 
11
  See Peter J. Leithart, Social Science v. Theology (11 August 2015) First Things 
<http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/leithart/2015/08/social-science-v-theology-
1>.  An early study of the tradition of moral philosophy, which was typically 
taught by the college president, is D. H. Meyer, The Instructed Conscience: The 
Shaping of the American National Ethic (University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1972). 
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‘sodomy’: that’s avoidance. My students don’t know the word ‘fornication’: 
that’s forgetfulness.12 
Breaking down the sacred/social interdicts
13
 and conscientious barriers 
that inhibit social and sexual misconduct provokes crises of conscience 
and authority that may lead to demoralization and, under mounting social 
pressure, conversion from one side to another in the ensuing cultural 
revolution.
14
 Using a natural law analysis, Budziszewski has summarized 
this dynamic process by identifying an attribute or mechanism by which a 
hostile takeover of the conscience may favor such a conversion: 
If the law written on the heart can be repressed, then we cannot count on it to 
restrain us from doing wrong; that much is obvious.  I have made the more 
paradoxical claim that repressing it hurls us into further wrong.  Holding 
conscience down does not deprive it of its force; it merely distorts and redirects 
that force ...  
Here is how it works.  Guilt, guilty knowledge, and guilty feelings are not the 
same thing; men and women can have the knowledge without the feelings, and 
they can have the feelings without the fact.  Even when suppressed, however, 
the knowledge of guilt always produces certain objective needs, which make 
their own demand for satisfaction irrespective of the state of the feelings.  These 
needs include confession, atonement, reconciliation, and justification.
15
 
                                           
12
  J. Budziszewski, The Revenge of Conscience: Politics and the Fall of Man 
(Spence, 1999) 20. 
13
  Philip Rieff was one of the most profound thinkers upon our social science-
promoted cultural revolution (kulturkampf) against the older sacred order with 
its system of moral obligations (interdicts), frequently by endorsing 
transgressions against it.  Philip Rieff, Sacred Order/Social Order, vol. 1: My 
Life among the Deathworks: Illustrations of the Aesthetics of Authority 
(University of Virginia Press, 2006) xix. 
14
  A sampling of the relevant literature would include Mary Eberstadt, It’s 
Dangerous to Believe: Religious Freedom and Its Enemies (Harper, 2016); 
David Gelernter, America-Lite: How Imperial Academia Dismantled Our 
Culture (and Ushered in the Obamacrats) (Encounter, 2012); as well as the 
Toledano and Kengor books noted above. 
15
  Budziszewski, above n 12, 27-28. 
176 Samson, An Imperium of Rights 2016 
 
Where the ‘force of conscience’ leads with regard to the larger culture 
becomes evident when Budziszewski unpacks the four objective needs 
produced by a guilty conscience that lives in a state of denial: ‘The need 
for reconciliation arises from the fact that guilt cuts us off from God and 
Man.  Without repentance, intimacy must be simulated precisely by 
sharing with others in the guilty act ...’.16  Thus step-by-step does the 
transgressive become empowered as a right. 
In What Is Secular Humanism? (1982) James Hitchcock summarizes the 
West’s transition from a Bible-based moral and political culture as 
follows:  
The moral revolution was achieved in a variety of ways.  On the simplest level, 
it consisted merely of talking about what was hitherto unmentionable.  Subjects 
previously forbidden in the popular media (abortion, incest) were presented for 
the first time.
17
   
Resistance was gradually broken down by making these subjects 
increasingly familiar.
18
  Marshall Kirk and Hunter Madsen, who 
developed a public relations campaign for gay rights, called this first 
stage ‘desensitization’. 19   Similar stages of development are also 
identified by Hitchcock: 
                                           
16
  Ibid 29.  Thus a guilty conscience may be captured and converted; so, likewise, 
may an institution that faces a cognitive dissonance or crisis of confidence that 
leads it to abandon or modify its mission. 
17
  James Hitchcock, What Is Secular Humanism? Why Humanism Became Secular 
and How It Is Changing Our World (Servant Books, 1982) 83. 
18
  Familiarity has a disarming effect.  Here is an excerpt from Aleksandr 
Solzhenitsyn’s 1983 Templeton Lecture: ‘Today’s world has reached a stage 
which, if it had been described to preceding centuries, would have called forth 
the cry: “This is the Apocalypse!”  Yet we have grown used to this kind of 
world; we even feel at home in it.’  Edward E. Ericson, Jr., and Daniel J. 
Mahoney (eds) The Solzhenitsyn Reader: New and Essential Writings, 1947-
2005 (ISI Books, 2006) 578. 
19
  David Kupelian, The Marketing of Evil: How Radicals, Elitists, and Pseudo-Experts Sell Us 
Corruption Disguised as Freedom (WND Books, 2005) 25-26. 
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The second stage of the revolution is ridicule, the single most powerful weapon 
in any attempt to discredit accepted beliefs. Within a remarkably brief time, 
values the media had celebrated during the 1950s (family, religion, patriotism) 
were subjected to a merciless and constant barrage of satire.  Only people with 
an exceptionally strong commitment to their beliefs could withstand being 
depicted as buffoons ... Negative stereotypes were created, and people who 
believed in traditional values were kept busy avoiding being trapped in those 
stereotypes.
20
   
This corresponds with ‘jamming’ in the Kirk-Madsen strategy.21  It can 
be quite effective.  Mary Eberstadt begins her new book, It’s Dangerous 
to Believe, by citing numerous examples of it, culminating in the 
bewildered question: ‘Where will we go?’22 Of course, the culmination of 
the process should be familiar enough with the literature on 
‘brainwashing’, the Stockholm syndrome, and related phenomena.  
Again, Hitchcock: 
The final stage of the moral revolution is the media’s exploitation of traditional 
American sympathy for the underdog.  Judaeo-Christian morality, although 
eroding for a long time and on the defensive almost everywhere in the Western 
                                           
20
  Hitchcock, What Is Secular Humanism? Why Humanism Became Secular and 
How It Is Changing Our World (Servant Books, 1982) 83-84. Kenneth Minogue 
similarly offered a tripartite simplification of Marxism as a model or formula 
for developing an ideology: 1) ‘the past is the history of the oppression of some 
abstract class of person’; 2) ‘the duty of the present is thus to mobilize the 
oppressed class in the struggle against the oppressive system’; and 3) ‘the aim 
of this struggle is to attain a fully just society, a process generally called 
liberation.’  Kenneth Minogue, Politics: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, 
2000) 101. 
21
  David Kupelian, The Marketing of Evil: How Radicals, Elitists, and Pseudo-
Experts Sell Us Corruption Disguised as Freedom (WND Books, 2005) 26. 
Tom Wolfe reported on a similar practice in Mau-Mauing the Flak Catchers, 
(Cosmopolitan, April 1971).  
22
  Mary Eberstadt, It’s Dangerous to Believe: Religious Freedom and Its Enemies 
(Harper, 2016) ix-xvi. 
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world, is presented as a powerful, dominant, and even tyrannical system against 
which only a few brave souls make a heroic stand on behalf of freedom.
23
  
But a campaign of mounting pressure and growing public sympathy may 
finally elicit a ‘bandwagon’ effect that culminates in the Kirk-Madsen 
strategy’s third stage: ‘conversion’.24  Above all, all of this illustrates J. 
Budziszewski’s point about objective needs, such as the distortion of 
people’s need for reconciliation that occurs when they substitute a new 
bond to compensate for a broken one:     
The need for reconciliation has a public dimension, too.  Isolated from the 
community of moral judgment, transgressors strive to gather a substitute around 
themselves.  They do not sin privately; they recruit.  The more ambitious among 
them go further.  Refusing to go to the mountain, they require the mountain to 
come to them: society must be transformed so that it no longer stands in awful 
judgment. So it is that they can change the laws, infiltrate the schools, and 
create intrusive social-welfare bureaucracies.
25
 
This trend should be abundantly evident through the ideological 
conversion and transformation of the American culture into its present 
post-modern, post-Christian form.  Alexander Salter notes: 
                                           
23
  Hitchcock, What Is Secular Humanism? Why Humanism Became Secular and 
How It Is Changing Our World (Servant Books, 1982) 84.  Mary Eberstadt 
updates this metanarrative: ‘The faithful have been on the losing end of 
skirmish after skirmish for decades now—some would say centuries.  Yet their 
adversaries nevertheless continue to treat them as practically omnipotent, and 
perpetually malevolent, social forces, even as one cherished cause after 
another—nearly all the vaunted issues of the so-called culture wars—chalks up 
as a loss.’  Mary Eberstadt, It’s Dangerous to Believe: Religious Freedom and 
Its Enemies (Harper, 2016) xxviii. 
24
  David Kupelian, The Marketing of Evil: How Radicals, Elitists, and Pseudo-
Experts Sell Us Corruption Disguised as Freedom (WND Books, 2005) 27. 
25
  Budziszewski, above n 12, 29-30.  Frederic Bastiat’s concept of legal plunder – 
the ability to acquire ill-gotten gains under color of law – offers a parallel, 
especially when it is converted into ‘universal plunder’ so that the plundered 
classes become complicit in picking their own pockets. Bastiat, Frederic. The 
Law (Foundation for Economic Education, 1972).  See also 
<http://bastiat.org/>. 
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Progressivism manifested itself in the United States first as a desire 
for the alleviation of social ills, then in the educational establishment 
for discovering solutions to eliminate these ills, and finally 
culminated in the offices of the government for implementing these 
solutions. The importance of the two institutional categories, 
Academy and State, cannot be overstated when considering how 
Progressivism won the battle of world views.
26
 
What Sherif Girgis calls the New Gnosticism is providing ideological 
tools for seizing Lenin’s proverbial ‘commanding heights’ of public 
influence. Writing of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. 
Hodges (2015) to recognize gay marriage as the law of the land, Girgis 
contends that 
the Court implicitly made a number of other assumptions: that one-flesh union 
has no distinct value in itself, only the feelings fostered by any kind of 
consensual sex; that there is nothing special about knowing the love of the two 
people whose union gave you life, whose bodies gave you yours, so long as you 
have two sources of care and support; that what children need is parenting in 
some disembodied sense, and not mothering and fathering. It effectively had to 
treat contrary views as irrational. 
That conclusion suggests that the body doesn’t matter. When it comes to 
what fulfills us, we are not personal animals – mammalian thinkers, to put 
it starkly – who come in two basic forms that complete each other. We 
are subjects of desire and consent, who use bodily equipment for spiritual 
                                           
26
  Alexander Salter, Why Progressivism Will Win, (June 26, 2016) The 
Imaginative Conservative 
<http://www.theimaginativeconservative.org/2016/06/why-progressivism-will-
win.html>. 
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and emotional expression. Fittingly, then, has this new doctrine been 
called the New Gnosticism.
 27
 
 
III REVOLUTIONARY FAITHS 
Eric Voegelin specifically used the term Gnosticism to stand for the 
‘ersatz religion’ of modern mass movements, turning to Joachim of 
Flora’s historical speculation of great three ages as a model.  Voegelin 
identified four Joachitic symbols which he claimed to be characteristic of 
these mass movements: 1) the third realm, 2) the leader (or dux), 3) the 
prophet, and 4) the community of the chosen.  Particularly relevant here 
is the third symbol: that of the prophet or precursor. ‘With the creation of 
the symbol of the precursor, a new type emerges in Western history: the 
intellectual who knows the formula for salvation from the misfortunes of 
the world and can predict how world history will take its course in the 
future.’28 
This third symbol, which plays a crucial role in the ‘empowerment of 
rights’, corresponds to what Joel Kotkin calls the Clerisy, ‘which is based 
largely in the worlds of academia, media, government, and the nonprofit 
sector ... The power of the Clerisy stems primarily not from money or the 
                                           
27
  Sherif Girgis, Obergefell and the New Gnosticism (6 June 2016) First Things 
<http://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2016/06/obergefell-and-the-new-
gnosticism>.  Some of the early church heresies, such as Docetism, abhorred the 
gross physicality of embodiment.  The great irony is that the authority of 
political bodies must be captured in order to denigrate the importance of the 
human body.   
28
  Eric Voegelin, Science, Politics, and Gnosticism: Two Essays (Henry Regnery, 
1968) 97.  Three ages, three stages: a secular trinitarianism has become 
formulaic, whether in terms of a Third Reich, a Third Way, or Auguste Comte’s 
Law of the Three Stages.  Voegelin here applies this template to an analysis of 
Marx and Engels, Dante, Hitler and Mussolini, Lenin and Stalin, Thomas More, 
Thomas Hobbes, and G. W. F. Hegel. 
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control of technology, but from persuading, instructing, and regulating 
the rest of society.’29 
The U.S. Supreme Court is perhaps first among these arbiters of the 
prevailing public philosophy.  Its chief role in the past was to act as a 
guardian of the Constitution of Limitations, as Edward S. Corwin 
characterized it, as it was devised by its framers in 1787.  With the rise of 
the Progressive movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, the academic establishment began to convert to Progressivism as 
an expression of what John Dewey called ‘a common faith.’  The 
Supreme Court took its plunge into this faith around 1937 when it began 
to uphold the vast restructuring of the federal government known as the 
New Deal.
30
  Subsequent battles contributed to the further concentration 
of governing powers at the national level.  Although Corwin called it a 
Constitutional Revolution, Ltd., the revolution continues.
31
  Indeed, 
revolutions follow their own logic, as Alexis de Tocqueville, Crane 
Brinton, and others have observed. 
Girgis unpacks the logic of the situation in the wake of the Court’s ruling 
in Obergefell: ‘For decades, the Sexual Revolution was supposed to be 
about freedom.  Today, it is about coercion.  Once, it sought to free our 
sexual choices from restrictive laws and unwanted consequences.  Now, it 
seeks to free our sexual choices from other people's disapproval.’32  The 
                                           
29
  Joel Kotkin, The New Class Conflict (Telos Press, 2014) 8.  
30
  Following President Roosevelt’s failed attempt to ‘pack’ the Court with new 
members, this ‘conversion’ of the Court was humorously described as ‘the 
switch in time that saved Nine.’ 
31
  All of ‘these developments spell a diminished importance for . . . Liberty 
against Government.’  Edward S. Corwin, Constitutional Revolution, Ltd. 
(Claremont Colleges, 1941) 114. 
32
  Sherif Girgis, Obergefell and the New Gnosticism (6 June 2016) First Things 
<http://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2016/06/obergefell-and-the-new-
gnosticism>. 
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Court has arrogated to itself the role of theologian-in-chief, which 
Thomas Hobbes had earlier wished to reserve to the Crown: 
Obergefell is thus best seen as a religious bull from our national Magisterium, 
the Supreme Court, by the pen of its high priest, Justice Kennedy. With all the 
solemnity of a Chalcedon or Trent, it formalized new doctrines for our nation’s 
civil religion—Gnostic ideas about the human person. Ideas that, by their very 
nature, create an obligation to recruit new adherents. (And ideas that—unlike 
true religion—could serve their purpose whether or not they were accepted 
freely.)
33
 
One strategy that Girgis has identified for empowering rights is the 
awkwardly denominated concept of ‘dignitary harms’, which has roots 
that date back to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
held in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 US 241, 250 
(1964) that ‘the fundamental object of Title II was to vindicate “the 
deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal 
access to public establishments.’” 
Unsurprisingly, given the tenets of the New Gnosticism, it has been invoked 
only in connection with conscience claims in the sex-and-reproduction culture 
wars. Until now free speech claims have been safe against such erosions, by a 
virtual consensus of our legal culture that political speech needs most protection 
precisely when it offends. But the consensus may soon be shattered by efforts to 
fight offensive speech on sex and marriage.
34
 
As James Hitchcock anticipated more than three decades earlier, Girgis 
notes that the logic of the latest phase of the sexual revolution is to 
require the affirmative approval of behaviour that is censured in the 
Bible. 
                                           
33
  Ibid. 
34
  Ibid. 
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It’s not that the New Gnostics are an especially vindictive bunch.  It's that a 
certain kind of coercion is built into their view from the start.  If your most 
valuable, defining core just is the self that you choose to express, there can be 
no real difference between you as a person, and your acts of self-expression; I 
can’t affirm you and oppose those acts.  Not to embrace self-expressive acts is to 
despise the self those acts express.  I don’t simply err by gainsaying your sense 
of self. I deny your existence, and do you an injustice.  For the New Gnostic, 
then, a just society cannot live and let live, when it comes to sex.  Sooner or 
later, the common good—respect for people as self-defining subjects—will 
require social approval of their self-definition and -expression.
35
 
IV COSMOPOLITAN AS AN ELITE STRATEGY OF DIVIDE 
AND RULE 
Human rights remain a fluid category, subject to negotiation and 
redefinition, both domestically and internationally.
36
  The idea of global 
governance is associated with cosmopolitanism, but it can be 
characterized, as Ross Douthat does, as ‘liberal Christianity without 
Christ.’37  What passes for cosmopolitanism these days is the self-conceit 
of a rising power elite that has hitched its wagon to multinational 
corporations and transnational institutions.
38
 Vilfredo Pareto’s concept of 
the ‘circulation of elites’ offers some insights into how these processes 
work with respect to the flow of elite membership. Pareto drew upon 
                                           
35
  Ibid. 
36
  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) added economic, social, 
and cultural rights (Art 22-28) to the earlier civil and political rights.   
37
  Ross Douthat, ‘The Myth of Cosmopolitanism’ The New York Times (online), 2 
July 2016 <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/opinion/sunday/the-myth-of-
cosmopolitanism.html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-
share&_r=0>. 
38
  Compare James Kurth above n 10.  The economist Thomas Sowell characterizes 
this public ideology as a ‘quest for cosmic justice’ in a book by that title.  His 
critical summary is wonderfully succinct: ‘1. The impossible is not going to be 
achieved. 2. It is a waste of precious resources to try to achieve it. 3. The 
devastating costs and social dangers which go with these attempts to achieve the 
impossible should be taken into account.’ <http://tsowell.com/spquestc.html>. 
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Machiavelli to identify two ‘residues’ or types of individuals admitted to 
or excluded from elite status: Class I (Foxes) and Class II (Lions).  As 
James Burnham summarizes: Individuals marked by Class I 
(Combinations) residues are Foxes that ‘live by their wits; they put their 
reliance on fraud, deceit, and shrewdness.  They do not have strong 
attachment to family, church, nation, and traditions (though they may 
exploit these attachments in others)’.  On the other hand,  
Individuals marked by Class II (Group-Persistences) residues are Machiavelli’s 
“Lions.”  They are able and ready to use force, relying on it rather than brains to 
solve their problems.  They are conservative, patriotic, loyal to tradition, and 
solidly tied to supra-individual groups like family or Church or nation.  They 
are concerned for posterity and the future.  In economic affairs they are 
cautious, saving and orthodox.  They distrust the new, and praise “character” 
and “duty” rather than wits.39 
Pareto analyzed both the United States and European nations just prior to 
the First World War and found that the circulation of elites during the 
previous century had ‘brought most of these nations into a condition 
where the ruling classes were heavily over-weighted with Class I 
residues, and were subject to debilitating humanitarian beliefs.’40  Under 
the increasing dominance of the Foxes, the “individual comes to prevail, 
and by far, over family, community, nation ... The impulse is to enjoy the 
present without too much thought for the morrow.”41  Moreover, Foxes 
                                           
39
  James Burnham, The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom (Henry Regnery, 
1943) 238.
  
40
  Ibid 245-46.  ‘Residues’ are ‘constant or only very slowly changing psychic 
tendencies, much like instincts.’  Daniel Kelly, James Burnham and the 
Struggle for the World (ISI Books, 2002) 105-06. 
41
  Ibid 247.  Such improvidence is evident in political liberalism’s use of 
entitlement spending (similar to Bastiat’s universal plunder) to weaken 
resistance to the wholesale transformation of society. It is also evident in its 
inability to seriously address threats to the survival of the West.  By 1960, 
Burnham characterized liberalism as ‘the ideology of Western suicide.’  Daniel 
Kelly, James Burnham and the Struggle for the World (ISI Books, 2002) 287. 
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protect their positions by hamstringing possible sources of opposition via 
red tape.  One consequence is what Paul Rahe has called a ‘politics of 
distrust’,42 which tends to favor a strategy of ‘divide and rule.’  
We see a counterpart to this Machiavellian politics of distrust in 
American foreign policy with the ‘secession of elites’, which Walter 
Russell Mead noted with regard to alliances, referring to it as ‘a loss of 
support from this key class of opinion leaders.’43   
During the Cold War, and even subsequently, the political elites of 
American 
Allies performed a critical task that Americans cannot do: they argued the case 
for the American alliance and for cooperating with the United States in their 
own countries ... Even when from time to time such leaders disagreed with 
specific aspects of American policy, they were a force for mutual 
understanding, for limiting the fallout of policy disagreements and, in the last 
analysis, for doing the hard and necessary work to keep the alliances strong.
44
 
The prospects for such a fallout are compounded when these elites adopt 
what Michael Polanyi called the principle of ‘moral inversion’ 45  and 
                                           
42
  Unpublished paper: ‘Don Corleone, Multiculturalist.’ 
43
  Walter Russell Mead, Power, Terror, Peace, and War: American Grand 
Strategy in a World at Risk (Alfred A. Knopf, 2004) 150. 
44
  Ibid 149-50. 
45
  Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy 
(Harper Torchbooks, 1964) 231-35.  Polanyi described Marxism as ‘a fanatical 
cult of power’ (231).  Roger Scruton used the phrase ‘culture of repudiation’ to 
characterize the phenomenon:  
The message of the media, the academy, and the opinion-forming elite is 
feminist, anti-patriarchal, and opposed to traditional sexual prohibitions 
such as those governing abortion, homosexuality, and sex outside 
marriage.   More importantly, the culture of the elite has undergone a kind 
of ‘moral inversion,’ to use Michael Polanyi’s idiom.  Permission turns to 
prohibition, as the advocacy of alternatives gives way to a war against the 
former orthodoxy.  The family, far from enjoying the status of a legitimate 
alternative to the various ‘transgressive’ postures lauded by the elite, is 
dismissed out of hand as a form of oppression.   
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promote the making of a counterculture.  In Silent Revolution (2014) 
Barry Rubin showed how what he called the ‘Third Left’ was able to 
‘manufacture false consciousness as an asset for the cause.’ 
By such methods, the Third Left proved Marx wrong.  It convinced people by a 
cultlike total immersion in its own doctrine.  The children of corporate 
executives could be turned into revolutionaries in the classroom.  Ideas could 
overcome material conditions; getting people to read the right books might have 
more effect on them than the surrounding reality because the surrounding reality 
would be interpreted through the left’s ideas.46 
By now it should be evident that something much larger than a sexual 
revolution or a mere political movement is at work.  So let us now apply 
these observations to the European project as the Italian philosopher 
Marcello Pera has described it.   
As Pera notes in Why We Should Call Ourselves Christians, the ‘positive’ 
values that are proposed by Jürgen Habermas (his ‘constitutional 
patriotism’ toward the European Charter) to replace religion and 
nationality are democracy, welfare state, environment, and peace.
47
  This 
is an updating of Immanuel Kant’s prescription of ‘liberal 
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  Barry Rubin, Silent Revolution: How the Left Rose to Political Power and Cultural Dominance 
(Broadside Books, 2014) 82-83.  Theodore Dalrymple has stated the dynamic very clearly:  
Political correctness is communist propaganda writ small.  In my study of communist 
societies, I came to the conclusion that the purpose of communist propaganda was not to 
persuade or convince, nor to inform, but to humiliate; and therefore, the less it 
corresponded to reality the better.  When people are forced to remain silent when they 
are being told the most obvious lies, or even worse when they are forced to repeat the lies 
themselves, they lose once and for all their sense of probity.  To assent to obvious lies is 
to co-operate with evil, and in some small way to become evil oneself.  One's standing to 
resist anything is thus eroded, and even destroyed.  A society of emasculated liars is easy 
to control.  I think if you examine political correctness, it has the same effect and is 
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<http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=7445>.  
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  Marcello Pera, Why We Should Call Ourselves Christians: The Religious Roots 
of Free Societies (Encounter Books, 2011) 89.  It revives on a much larger scale 
the ideal of the classical republic with its own civil religion. 
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cosmopolitanism’: the disappearance of traditional national boundaries, 
citizenship extended to everyone (such transnationalism shapes the 
immigration debate), the ‘kingdom of ends of ends in themselves’, and a 
vision of perpetual peace.
48
   
But Pera finds this program to be too generic and abstract.  It divorces 
itself from its historical foundation in Christianity.  The ‘secular 
equation’ of liberalism with secularism – with its rejection of Christianity 
– breeds what he calls the ‘ethical deficit of constitutional patriotism.’49  
Pera argues that constitutional patriotism is no substitute for Christianity 
because it, likewise, contains a deficit or vacuum it cannot fill: 
Here we draw closer to the crux of constitutional patriotism, political liberalism, 
and secular Europe.  Where does the concept of the person originate?  It does 
not derive from the practice of argumentation, because it is a presupposition for 
that practice.  It does not derive from democratic procedures allowed by 
institutions, because these take the idea of the person as their point of reference.  
Clearly it derives from outside the practice of argumentation or democratic 
procedures.  The concept of the person, or the end in itself, i.e. that each 
individual must be respected because as an individual he is endowed with 
dignity, is a pre-political and obviously non-political concept.  It is a concept of 
an ethical-religious nature, and more precisely it is a Christian concept.  It 
follows that, just as liberalism cannot be self-sufficient, constitutional patriotism 
cannot separate itself from pre-political elements.  If constitutional patriotism is 
                                           
48
  Ibid 86-87.  At the outset of his analysis, Pera warns of the dangers of secular 
liberalism:  
 
For the destinies of Europe and the West, this ideology is no less 
dangerous [than Nazism or communism]; it is far more insidious.  It does 
not wear the brutal face of violence, but the alluring smile of culture.  
With its words, liberal secularism preaches freedom, tolerance, and 
democracy, but with its deeds it attacks precisely that Christian religion 
which prevents freedom from deteriorating into license, tolerance into 
indifference, democracy into anarchy. 
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to support the European Charter, it cannot set aside the pre-political elements of 
European history, and particularly its ethical Christian and religious elements.
50
 
Rather than recognize Christianity, however, ‘liberal European culture 
accepts the secular equation and rejects Christianity.’  As Pera concludes: 
‘[L]iberal European culture can produce no notion of European identity, 
either religious or secular.  In the end, it opposes the very thing it wishes 
to promote: the unification of Europe.’51   
Amidst a long and anguished identity crisis, the West suffers a deficit in 
the moral character – a loss of the requisite thickness of authority – that is 
required to protect the rights of persons and to resist militant ideologies 
and their shock troops.  The West instead has chosen to unilaterally 
disarm itself.  Even in the early nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville 
already had a sense of the danger – early during the democratic 
experiment – of what is variously called tyranny of the majority (or by 
those ruling in the name of the majority) and soft despotism.
52
 
So, today, the French revolutionary nationalism that broke with the Old 
Regime has at last given way more recently to yet another secular faith: 
the revolutionary cosmopolitanism of global governance erected and 
managed by a Rousseauan Legislator that has given rise to complaints 
about a ‘deficit of democracy’ and, most recently, ‘Brexit.’  At its heart 
lies a contradiction, as Chantal Delsol describes: 
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International justice is de-localized, de-temporalized.  Where then will the 
international law it proclaims be renewed, debated, qualified, or amended?  In 
fact, international justice merely lives an artificial life among a small coterie of 
cosmopolitan intellectuals.  But can one judge real human beings who 
committed crimes in particular places and times, in particular circumstances, 
with laws written in Heaven?  To want to realize the universal, to grant it real 
existence, to establish it as a policy and a tribunal—this is to dis-incarnate 
humanity, to compel it to live in abstract kingdoms.
53
 
Delsol’s complaint appears likewise to be about a New Gnosticism.  
Perhaps this is a key to understanding the challenges we face.  The 
problem is not ‘the universal.’  The real danger arises from a spurious 
utopian sort of universality promoted by ideologues.
54
  We have chosen 
to embrace utopian abstractions that tend to dissolve the human 
dimension even as our would-be benefactors seek to bring heaven down 
to earth.
55
  The result has too often been what R. J. Rummel has called 
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‘democide’.56  Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who was exiled by one of these 
utopias, stated the problem in universal terms: 
[T]he events of the Russian Revolution can only be understood now, at the end 
of the century, against the background of what has occurred in the rest of the 
world. What emerges here is a process of universal significance.  And if I were 
called upon to identify briefly the principal trait of the entire twentieth century, 
here too I would be unable to find anything more precise or pithy than to repeat 
once again: “Men have forgotten God.”57 
V FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: ABSOLUTISM DRAPES ITSELF IN THE 
MANTLE OF LIBERTY 
Global governance and the human rights movement are likewise part of 
this ‘process of universal significance.’ As Todd Huizinga has put it: 
‘Neither the global governance movement nor the human rights 
movement associated with it accepts, in principle, any limits handed 
down by tradition or by the human experience of reality.’58  Once custom 
is converted into law, your right becomes my duty.  Politics today may be 
most aptly characterized as the hue and cry of ‘gusts of passion’ that 
dream of world peace and soft utopias.  As Shelley said of the sculptor in 
‘Ozymandias’, we may say that Francis Lieber ‘well those passions read.’  
We would do well to take his counsel and heed his warning: ‘Absolutism 
in our age is daringly draping itself in the mantle of liberty, both in 
Europe and here.  What we suffer in this respect is in many cases the 
                                           
56
  See R. J. Rummel, Death by Government (Transaction, 1997). 
57
  Solzhenitsyn’s Templeton Lecture, 10 May 1983, is reprinted in Edward 
Ericson Jr and Daniel Mahoney (eds), The Solzhenitsyn Reader: New and 
Essential Writings, 1947-2005 (ISI Books, 2006) 577. 
58
  Todd Huizinga, The New Totalitarian Temptation: Global Governance and the 
Crisis of Democracy in Europe (Encounter Books, 2016) xiv.   
Vol 7 The Western Australian Jurist 191 
 
 
after-pain of Rousseauism, which itself was nothing but democratic 
absolutism.’59 
We have forgotten our creaturely limits.  Out utopian aspirations, which 
threaten civil society and our capacity for self-government, can only 
dehumanize and spiritually imprison us.  Writing at a time of what he 
called ‘depressed public min’ on the cusp of the American Civil War, 
Francis Lieber acknowledged that ‘Truth becomes irksome, and while it 
is deemed heroic boldly to speak to a monarch, he who censures the 
sovereign in a republic is looked upon as no friend of the country.’  What 
he said in his inaugural lecture at what is now Columbia University is just 
as true today: 
[I]t is a characteristic of our present public life that almost every conceivable 
question is drawn within the spheres of politics ... Fair and frank discussion has 
thus become emasculated and the people submit to dictation.  There is a wide 
class of topics of high importance which cannot be taken in hand even by the 
most upright thinker without its being suspected that he is in the service of one 
party or section of the country and hostile to the other.
60
 
                                           
59
  Francis Lieber, ‘The Ancient and Modern Teacher of Politics’ in 
Reminiscences, Addresses, and Essays, vol. 1, Miscellaneous Writings (J. B. 
Lippincott, 1880) 383. 
60
  Ibid 385. The confusion of political with despotic means in the form of 
‘political moralism’ is the thread that runs through Kenneth Minogue’s Politics 
and, for that matter, the growing imperium of rights: ‘It can be seen working in 
a number of different areas, and we may illustrate the way it works by looking 
at the project that the nationally sovereign state should be replaced by the 
emerging international moral order.’  Kenneth Minogue, Politics: A Very Short 
Introduction (Oxford, 2000) 104. 
